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APPLYING THE PRIVATE BENEFIT 
DOCTRINE TO FARMLAND CONSERVATION 
EASEMENTS 
PAIGE MADELINE GENTRY† 
ABSTRACT 
  Farmland or working-land conservation easements serve two 
purposes. One is charitable, to protect open space from development; 
the other is practical, to preserve the land in productive agricultural 
use. These purposes, however, create a tension in the easement itself 
that can force the land trust that holds the easement to choose between 
the two purposes when the easement, meant in part to protect the 
farm, threatens the farm’s continued viability. 
  Neutral-impact amendments are amendments to working-land 
easements that allow farmers to improve farm production or viability 
without harming the conservation value of the easements. Such 
amendments seem beneficial: a land trust can advance one of its goals 
of keeping agricultural land productive–without sacrificing the other 
goal of preserving the conservation value of the land. By approving 
such an amendment, however, a land trust likely violates the private 
benefit doctrine and risks losing its tax-exempt status. This Note 
argues that the IRS should explicitly decide not to apply the private 
benefit doctrine to neutral-impact amendments of farmland and 
working-land conservation easements. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine this scenario: many years ago, a farmer, fearing that his 
lands might be turned into strip malls or housing subdivisions, 
 
Copyright © 2013 by Paige Madeline Gentry. 
 † Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2013; Swarthmore College, B.A. 2007. I 
would like to thank Koree Blyleven and Matt McGuire for their thoughtful comments and 
advice on this Note. Much thanks also goes to my advisor, Professor Richard Schmalbeck, and 
to the rest of the staff on the Duke Law Journal for their guidance and work on the piece. 
GENTRY IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2013  3:51 PM 
1388 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1387 
decided to conserve his farmland.1 Working with a conservation land 
trust, he protected his land through a conservation easement. The 
conservation easement allowed the farmer to continue farming the 
land, but it limited any future development of the land to ensure that 
the land would remain farmed in perpetuity. Today, the farmer is 
struggling—he has had a bad crop year and is worried about his 
income. A utility company approaches the farmer, asking to lease 
space inside the farmer’s silo. The utility company wants to place its 
antennas inside the silo, removing the need to build cellular towers 
along nearby ridges. For both parties, this lease seems like the perfect 
opportunity—the farmer gains rental income and financial stability, 
and the utility company finds a place for its antennas while still 
protecting open space and scenic views. 
Unfortunately, the terms of the conservation easement prohibit 
new development on the farm. These terms seem to prohibit the 
antennas, thus necessitating an amendment to the original easement. 
To both the land trust and the farmer, the amendment seems like a 
good idea. The amendment would allow the land trust to balance two 
different goals: the underlying conservation value of the land remains 
protected, and the extra income ensures that the farmer can continue 
the farming operation. To all sides, this arrangement seems like a no-
brainer, until the parties examine tax law. 
Under the private benefit doctrine, tax-exempt organizations2 
cannot confer a nonincidental benefit on private individuals or 
organizations.3 A tax-exempt organization that does confer such a 
nonincidental benefit runs the risk of losing its federal tax-exempt 
status.4 If the land trust amends its conservation easement covering 
the farmer’s land, the IRS might find that the land trust conferred a 
primary private benefit to the farmer (the rental fees from the 
antennas inside the silo) and a secondary private benefit to the utility 
 
 1. This hypothetical is derived from Darby Bradley, Amending Perpetual Conservation 
Easements: Confronting the Dilemmas of Change: A Practitioner’s View 27 (Dec. 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.vlt.org/images/0_Temporary/Bradley_
Amendments.pdf. 
 2. For the purposes of this Note, the phrase tax-exempt organization refers to groups that 
receive tax-exempt status as a charitable organization under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 3. Andrew Megosh, Lary Scollick, Mary Jo Salins & Cheryl Chasin, Private Benefit Under 
IRC 501(c)(3), in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: IRS TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 137, 138 (2000). 
 4. E.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, at 1 (Nov. 22, 1991). 
GENTRY IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2013  3:51 PM 
2013] CONSERVATION-EASEMENT AMENDMENTS 1389 
company (the ability to install the antennas cheaply).5 Under this 
reasoning, the amendment confers a nonincidental benefit to private 
interests, and the land trust could lose its tax-exempt status. 
Because land trusts risk losing their tax-exempt status after a 
single violation of the private benefit doctrine,6 it is important for 
land trusts to understand how to apply the doctrine and work within 
it. Although on its face the private benefit doctrine seems to be 
simple—tax-exempt organizations cannot confer a substantial benefit 
to noncharitable individuals or organizations—no one, not even the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), applies it consistently.7 It can be 
quite challenging for a land trust to conform its activities to a doctrine 
that lacks clear or predictable guidelines. 
Amendments to farmland conservation easements can create 
significant difficulties for land trusts trying to navigate both their 
charitable requirements and the needs of farmers. Farmland 
conservation easements, and working-land easements generally,8 are 
specifically designed to conserve farmland while allowing the 
landowner to continue farming the land.9 These easements serve two 
purposes. The primary purpose is to protect land from development 
for the greater public good,10 and the secondary purpose is to preserve 
 
 5. See infra Part III.A. Primary benefits are benefits that a tax-exempt organization 
confers directly on a noncharitable recipient. See infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
Secondary benefits are benefits indirectly received by a noncharitable recipient. See infra note 
89 and accompanying text. 
 6. Cf., e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, at 1 (discussing the case of a hospital that 
"jeopardized its exempt status" because of problems with the private benefit doctrine). 
 7. See John D. Colombo, Private Benefit: What Is It—And What Do We Want It To Be? 
2 (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“[N]either the courts 
nor IRS personnel know what ‘private benefit’ means, and . . . there is no coherent doctrinal 
definition of the concept.”). 
 8. This Note uses farmland conservation easement and working-land conservation 
easement interchangeably, although working-land easements are a broader category of 
conservation easements, encompassing easements on forested lands and ranchlands, as well as 
on farmland. 
 9. Judy Anderson & Jerry Cosgrove, Agricultural Easements: Allowing a Working 
Landscape To Work, EXCHANGE (Land Trust Alliance, Wash., D.C.), Fall 1998, at 9, 9. 
 10. See, e.g., EXHIBIT B: GRANT OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS, CONSERVATION 
RESTRICTIONS, OPTION TO PURCHASE AT AGRICULTURAL VALUE, AND CONTINGENT RIGHT 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 1, cl. 2 (2006), available at http://www.farmlandinfo.org/ 
documents/31319/Exhibit_B_Vermont.pdf (noting that the purposes of granting development 
rights are “to conserve scenic and natural resources associated with the Protected Property, to 
improve the quality of life for Vermonters, and to maintain for the benefit of future generations 
the essential characteristics of the Vermont countryside.”). 
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the land in productive agricultural use.11 These dual purposes, 
however, create a tension in the easement: conservation easements 
protect the land from development in perpetuity, but land 
preservation sometimes conflicts with the needs of a productive farm, 
particularly as both land- and farm-management practices and 
technologies change over time.12 A farmer’s ability to adapt to 
changing technologies and farming methods may be limited by the 
terms of the conservation easement. 
Although standard easement-amendment procedures prohibit a 
land trust from approving an amendment that creates a substantial 
private benefit for a private party,13 there is very little discussion of 
the private benefit doctrine and its application to conservation 
easement amendments in practitioner and industry publications or 
legal scholarship.14 In part, this is because the IRS, until recently, had 
rarely used the doctrine in relation to conservation land trusts. In 
March 2011, however, the IRS revoked a land trust’s charitable status 
in part because the land trust violated the private benefit doctrine by 
approving several amendments that negatively impacted the 
 
 11. See, e.g., id. § 1, cl. 1 (“[T]he primary purpose of this Grant is to conserve productive 
agricultural and forestry lands and soil resources in order to facilitate active and economically 
viable farm use of the Protected Property now and in the future.”). 
 12. Duncan M. Greene, Comment, Dynamic Conservation Easements: Facing the Problem 
of Perpetuity in Land Conservation, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 883, 884–85 (2005). 
 13. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, AMENDING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: EVOLVING 
PRACTICES AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES 17 (2007), available at http://learningcenter.lta.org/
attached-files/0/65/6534/Amendment_Report_Final_web.pdf. 
 14. See id. at 25–26 (recommending that land trusts undertake a private benefit analysis of 
their activities but providing only one example of a private benefit and no other guidance); 
LESLIE RATLEY-BEACH, MANAGING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS IN PERPETUITY 162–63 
(Sylvia Bates ed., 2009), available at http://learningcenter.lta.org/attached-files/ 0/95/9569/
DL_Managing_CE_05062010_lores.pdf (noting that land trusts “should scrutinize every 
conservation easement amendment proposal” for violations of the private benefit doctrine and 
briefly outlining the rules of the doctrine); Chris Cline, Inurement and Private Benefit: 
Avoidable Perils, in THE BACK FORTY ANTHOLOGY: SELECTED ARTICLES FROM THE 
NEWSLETTER OF LAND CONSERVATION LAW (William T. Hutton, Darrin S. Brown, Lisa M. 
Burkdall, Ellen A. Fred, Audra M. Mai & Erika M. Muhl eds., 2d ed. 2003) (discussing the 
private benefit doctrine and its implications for land trusts without applying it to conservation-
easement amendments); C. Timothy Lindstrom, Hicks v. Dowd: The End of Perpetuity?, 8 
WYO. L. REV. 25, 52–54 (2008) (discussing the general rules of the private benefit doctrine and 
noting that it is not often used); Bill Silberstein & Jessica Jay, Staying Within the Bounds of the 
Income Tax Code and Public Perception: Private Inurement and Private Benefit, EXCHANGE, 
(Land Trust Alliance, Wash., D.C.), Spring 1999 (discussing the concepts of private inurement 
and private benefit). 
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conservation value of the land.15 To make matters worse, the IRS and 
Congress have increased their scrutiny of land trusts, reviewing both 
the charitable purpose of land trusts and the validity of the charitable 
deductions received by donors of land.16 Viewed together, the recent 
revocation of a land trust’s tax-exempt status and the increased 
scrutiny of land trusts leave these organizations in a difficult place. 
They must be able to ensure that their policies do not violate a 
doctrine that has incoherent and inconsistent application by the IRS. 
Remedying this disconcerting situation requires a shift in the current 
understanding of the private benefit doctrine and, in particular, its 
application to neutral-impact amendments. Neutral-impact 
amendments, such as an amendment allowing a farmer to lease space 
inside his silo, are amendments that allow land trusts to balance the 
dual purposes of their working-land easements. A neutral-impact 
amendment does not negatively impact the conservation value of the 
land protected by an easement, thus preserving the easement’s 
charitable purpose. But such an amendment does change the 
language of the easement to aid the farmer, thus allowing a land trust 
to help keep the covered land in productive use. Yet, by approving a 
neutral-impact amendment, a land trust runs the risk of losing its tax-
exempt status. 
This Note argues that the IRS should not apply the private 
benefit doctrine to neutral-impact amendments to conservation 
easements. By helping preserve the working landscape without 
reducing the land’s conservation value, neutral-impact amendments 
actually serve the charitable purposes of land trusts. Instead, the 
private benefit doctrine should only be applied to amendments that 
abuse the nonprofit form, such as those that reduce the conservation 
value of the land. 
Part I addresses the basis of a land trust’s charitable status, the 
structure of conservation easements, and how amendments to 
 
 15. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-10020, at 26–27 (Mar. 11, 2011). The IRS also found that the 
land trust had violated the substantial-nonexempt-purpose test and the private inurement 
doctrine. Id. 
 16. See C. TIMOTHY LINDSTROM, A TAX GUIDE TO CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 11–12 
(2008) (“[T]he IRS has dramatically increased its scrutiny of conservation transactions . . . . The 
days of benign neglect of conservation transactions by the government appear to be over.”); 
Jason A. Richardson, Increased Scrutiny on Conservation Easement Donations: How a 
Crackdown on Tax Fraud by the IRS Could Impact Environmental Protection, 1 ENVTL. & 
ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 273, 273 (2006) (“In order to close the loophole that allowed for . . . tax 
fraud[,] the Internal Revenue Service . . . has increased its scrutiny of claims for these 
deductions.”). 
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easements put land trusts at risk of losing their tax-exempt status. 
Part II examines the private benefit doctrine. It notes the difficulties 
with the doctrine, outlines the basic tenets of the doctrine, and 
discusses the three main tests used to interpret and apply it. Part III 
applies these theories to neutral-impact amendments and finds that 
they likely violate the letter of the private benefit doctrine, even 
though the amendments do not negatively affect the conservation 
value of the land. Part IV argues that the private benefit doctrine 
should not apply to neutral-impact amendments because they do not 
violate the doctrine’s spirit. At its core, the private benefit doctrine is 
an anti-abuse doctrine, designed to protect the government from 
subsidizing noncharitable endeavors. Neutral-impact amendments do 
not abuse the tax-exempt form. Instead, they seek to give equal 
weight to the dual purposes of a working-land easement, purposes 
that the IRS has already sanctioned. 
I.  THE CHARITABLE STATUS OF CONSERVATION LAND TRUSTS 
AND THE STRUCTURE OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 
Conservation land trusts are private, tax-exempt organizations 
with a mission to preserve land and protect it from development.17 
Land trusts conserve land through a variety of methods, including 
deed restrictions, outright purchase, and the purchase or acceptance 
of donated conservation easements.18 Of these three options, land 
trusts most commonly use conservation easements to preserve land.19 
A conservation easement is a legal agreement that protects the 
conservation value of a particular property by restricting future 
development in perpetuity.20 Land trusts use conservation easements 
to protect a variety of properties, including forests, wetlands, beaches, 
historical buildings, gardens, wildlife properties, ranches, and 
farmland.21 Under a conservation easement, the landowner retains the 
ownership and certain rights of use of the land, but other uses are 
restricted.22 For example, easements typically limit or prohibit new 
 
 17. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, FACT SHEET: WHAT IS A LAND TRUST? 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/conservation/documents/what-is-land-trust.pdf. 
 18. Id. at 1–2. 
 19. Id. at 1. 
 20. ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT 
HANDBOOK 14 (2d ed. 2005). 
 21. Id. at 17; C. Timothy Lindstrom, Income Tax Aspects of Conservation Easements, 5 
WYO. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005). 
 22. BYERS & PONTE, supra note 20, at 17. 
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development but grandfather in existing development.23 If the 
landowner sells land with a conservation easement in place, the 
restrictions remain with the property.24 
Conservation easements can be donated or sold to either a 
government entity or a conservation land trust that holds the 
easement in perpetuity.25 A landowner who donates a conservation 
easement can receive a charitable deduction for the value of the 
easement under § 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.).26 As 
the holder of a conservation easement, a land trust has the right and 
the obligation to enforce the terms of the easement.27 Land trusts 
must monitor the land to ensure that the landowner has not violated 
the terms of the easement and may remedy violations if necessary.28 
The land trust is thus responsible for ensuring that the underlying 
environmental and conservation value of the easement remains intact 
over time. 
A land trust drafts its easements and enforces those easements’ 
restrictions to remain consistent with its charitable purpose. This Part 
outlines the basis for a land trust’s tax-exempt status, noting that the 
IRS does not consider farmland preservation alone to be a charitable 
purpose. This Part then highlights the relevant structures of a 
conservation easement that allow a land trust to meet its mission, 
focusing on amendment approval as an activity that puts a land trust 
at risk of losing its tax-exempt status. 
 
 23. Anderson & Cosgrove, supra note 9, at 11–13. 
 24. Lindstrom, supra note 21, at 6. 
 25. Id. at 5. 
 26. See I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(3)(B), (h) (2006). The value of an easement is determined by 
subtracting the fair market value of the land with development restrictions from the fair market 
value of the land without the restrictions. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3) (2003). 
 27. See Lindstrom, supra note 21, at 5 (noting that an obligation exists “if the donation of 
an easement is to qualify for federal tax benefits”). 
 28. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-10020, at 25 (Mar. 11, 2011) (“[A] qualified organization 
must be committed to protecting the conservation purposes of the donation and it must have the 
resources to enforce the restrictions. Furthermore, a qualified organization must be committed 
to protecting conservation easement contributions in perpetuity.”); RATLEY-BEACH, supra note 
14, at 14 (“Good relationships with landowners, thorough baseline documentation reports, 
regular (at least annual) easement monitoring visits and sound recordkeeping systems are the 
foundation of your land trust’s land protection efforts and fundamental to upholding its 
obligations.”). 
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A. Charitable Purpose of Land Trusts and Conservation Easements 
Under Federal Law 
To gain and maintain tax-exempt status, a land trust’s purpose 
and activities must meet one of the definitions of “charitable” under 
IRS rules. Although the language of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) does not 
mention land conservation, land trusts qualify for tax-exempt status if 
they have a charitable purpose of preserving and protecting “the 
natural environment for the benefit of the public.”29  
Because the IRS does not consider the preservation of farmland 
to be a charitable purpose, land trusts cannot have farmland 
preservation as their sole purpose.30 Instead, land trusts can qualify 
for tax-exempt status if they preserve “ecologically significant” 
farmland.31 The IRS views preserving ecologically significant farmland 
as a valid charitable purpose because doing so provides a significant 
public benefit and follows an “express national policy of conserving 
the nation’s unique national resources.”32 Alternatively, a land trust 
can have a charitable purpose, and thus tax-exempt status, if its 
farmland-conservation activities provide certain educational or 
scientific value.33 
Although I.R.C. § 170(h) sets forth the conditions under which a 
conservation easement qualifies as a charitable deduction for 
donors,34 the IRS and land trusts also use § 170(h) as a guideline to 
determine if a land trust itself qualifies as a tax-exempt organization.35 
 
 29. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,055, at 3 (Nov. 7, 1983). 
 30. Rev. Rul. 78-384, 1978-2 C.B. 174. 
 31. Rev. Rul. 76-204, 1976-1 C.B. 152, 153. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Dumaine Farms v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. 650, 653, 667–68 (1980) (holding that an 
experimental farm that did not have any ecologically significant attributes qualified for tax-
exempt status because it conducted scientific and educational activities), action on dec., 1980-45 
(Feb. 11, 1980). 
 34. I.R.C. § 170(h) (2006). 
 35. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-10020, at 23 (Mar. 11, 2011) (“The legislative history of 
section 170(h) indicates that Congress intended for the requirements of deductibility under 
I.R.C. § 170(h) to be compatible with the requirements for exemption under section 501(c)(3). 
Thus, there is strong support for the conclusion that conservation purposes under section 
170(h)(4)(A) may be considered exempt purposes under section 501(c)(3).”); I.R.S. Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 39,055, at 5 (Nov. 7, 1983) (“[T]he Trust considered herein does not meet the 
present standards for exemption for conservation organizations discussed in [Revenue Ruling 
76-204, 1976-1 C.B. 152, and Revenue Ruling 78-384, 1978-2 C.B. 174,] nor the broader 
standards set out in section 170(h).”); William T. Hutton, Agricultural Preservation: A Model 
Letter for Protesting Denial of Tax-Exempt Status, in THE BACK FORTY ANTHOLOGY, supra 
note 14, at 1.13 (noting that although the IRS grounds its denials of exemption in Revenue 
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Under § 170(h), a conservation easement is a “qualified conservation 
contribution” when the donor contributes qualified real property to a 
qualified organization, such as a land trust, to be used exclusively for 
conservation purposes.36 Valid conservation purposes under § 170(h) 
include preserving land for outdoor recreation, protecting natural 
habitats, preserving open space, and preserving historic sites.37 By 
extension, these conservation purposes are considered tax-exempt 
purposes for the land trust under § 501(c)(3).38 Additionally, the 
conserved land must be protected in perpetuity.39 For a land trust to 
demonstrate that it has met this requirement, it must have 
appropriate policies and sufficient resources to assure the IRS that 
the land trust will be able to protect the conserved land in 
perpetuity.40 
Farmland easements typically qualify for charitable status under 
the open-space requirement.41 To meet this requirement, the land 
must be preserved either “for the scenic enjoyment of the general 
public” or “pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, State, or local 
governmental conservation policy” and have a significant public 
benefit.42 Land trusts most frequently qualify their farmland 
conservation easements as charitable under the latter requirement.43 
 
Ruling 78-384, it has reversed its position when land trusts have argued for tax-exempt status 
under § 170(h)). 
 36. I.R.C. § 170(h)(1). 
 37. Id. § 170(h)(4)(A). 
 38. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-10020. 
 39. I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A). 
 40. Cf. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-10020, at 23–26 (revoking a land trust’s tax-exempt status 
in part because it had insufficient financial resources and monitoring policies to protect the land 
that it was charged with protecting in perpetuity). 
 41. I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii). 
 42. Id. 
 43. LINDSTROM, supra note 16, at 47. To meet the test for a clearly delineated 
governmental policy, the policy in question must be more than just a general declaration that 
the state or local government supports conservation. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(iii)(A) 
(2003). Instead, there should be a “specific, identified conservation project” or conservation 
plan within which the protected land fits. Id. The government entity must also be fully 
committed to the conservation program and can demonstrate its commitment through the use of 
preferential tax assessments or preferential zoning. Id. For example, a generalized agricultural 
zoning policy combined with a comprehensive plan designating some land as available for 
farming is likely too general to meet the requirement for a clearly delineated governmental 
policy. See LINDSTROM, supra note 16, at 47–48 (“In this case, the deduction would appear 
vulnerable because of the generalized nature of the governmental policies on which the 
easement relied.”). A combination of planning policies, zoning, and preferential tax treatment 
for agricultural areas, however, might be enough to satisfy the requirement. Id. at 48. The 
preserved land must also create a significant public benefit, defined in the regulations by eleven 
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B. The Structure of Farmland Conservation Easements 
Because the preservation of farmland alone does not qualify as a 
charitable purpose, farmland conservation easements have dual 
purposes and a structure that reflects those purposes. Farmland 
conservation easements are written to ensure compliance with IRS 
guidelines for tax-exempt organizations and to keep the farmland in 
production. This duality creates an inherent tension within the 
easement itself—the goal of land preservation will sometimes conflict 
with the goal of maintaining productive farmland. Because of this 
tension, there will be instances in which the farmland conservation 
easement limits the ability of the farmer to keep the land in 
production. The conservation goals will always trump the 
agricultural-production goals because the land trust relies on the 
conservation goals for its tax-exempt status, and the easement donor 
relies on the preservation goals to retain his or her charitable 
deduction. 
Farmland conservation easements do not explicitly acknowledge 
this tension, but they are structured to address these dual purposes. 
Four aspects of farmland conservation easements are relevant for this 
Note: (1) the purpose statement and recitals, (2) the restrictions and 
reserved rights, (3) the definition of agriculture, and (4) the 
administrative provisions, specifically the provisions on how to amend 
a conservation easement.44 
1. The Purpose Statement and Recitals.  A farmland conservation 
easement’s purpose-statement and recitals clauses include at least two 
purposes. One is conservation-oriented and thus charitable; the other 
focuses on preserving existing productive uses and is thus not 
inherently charitable.45 To ensure that the land trust is meeting its 
charitable requirements, one purpose statement will closely adhere to 
the IRS conservation purposes test.46 For example, a purpose 
statement might include a reference to the protection of scenic and 
 
different factors, including the uniqueness of the property and the importance of the property in 
its ability to attract tourism or commerce. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(iv). 
 44. BYERS & PONTE, supra note 20, at 302–07. 
 45. See, e.g., supra notes 10–11. 
 46. BYERS & PONTE, supra note 20, at 313; see also Lindstrom, supra note 21, at 14 (“In 
drafting a conservation easement it makes sense to include a description of the conservation 
purpose(s) of the conservation easement in terms that replicate the description of conservation 
purposes recognized by the Regulations.”). 
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open space or to the preservation of prime or unique soils.47 A second 
purpose statement will address the need to conserve particular 
productive agricultural lands.48 These two purposes demonstrate a 
land trust’s commitment to achieving its charitable goals while 
remaining mindful of the need to preserve productive agricultural 
lands. 
2. Restrictions and Reserved Rights.  The section on restrictions 
and reserved rights must clearly state the restrictions on the land and 
the rights that remain with the landowner.49 In a farmland 
conservation easement, this section is designed to strike a balance 
between the conservation purposes of the easement and the 
landowner’s farming operation.50 Common restrictions on farmland 
conservation easements include limits or prohibitions on subdivisions, 
new development, and new land uses.51 These restrictions allow the 
land trust to achieve its charitable purpose to preserve land from 
further development. 
To meet the second purpose of keeping farmland in production, 
a farmland conservation easement reserves several rights to the 
farmer, including the right to farm the land and the right to a 
farmstead complex.52 A farmstead complex reserves several acres of 
land on which the landowner can build and maintain farm structures 
without requesting permission from the land trust.53 Additional rights 
often reserved to the farmer include the right to develop a specific 
site in the future, particularly for farm-support housing,54 and the right 
 
 47. See BYERS & PONTE, supra note 20, at 313 (including “Other Open-Space Types” such 
as agriculture and forestry). 
 48. See supra note 11. 
 49. BYERS & PONTE, supra note 20, at 322–69. 
 50. See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text. 
 51. Anderson & Cosgrove, supra note 9, at 11–13. 
 52. E.g., EXHIBIT B: GRANT OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS, CONSERVATION RESTRICTIONS, 
OPTION TO PURCHASE AT AGRICULTURAL VALUE, AND CONTINGENT RIGHT OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 10, § 3, cl. 6. 
 53. See, e.g., AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION EASEMENT § 8(c) (2002), available at http://
www.farmlandinfo.org/documents/37237/Macedon_NY_Easement.pdf (“New buildings and 
other structures and improvements to be used primarily for agricultural purposes may be built 
on the Property within the Farmstead Area. New agricultural buildings, structures or 
improvements proposed for locations outside the Farmstead Area may be built only with the 
permission of the Grantee.”). 
 54. Anderson & Cosgrove, supra note 9, at 13; see also EXHIBIT B: GRANT OF 
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS, CONSERVATION RESTRICTIONS, OPTION TO PURCHASE AT 
AGRICULTURAL VALUE, AND CONTINGENT RIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
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to utilize new technology on the farm even if it was not specifically 
named in the easement.55 
3. Definition of Agriculture.  Farmland conservation easements 
also often tie the definitions of agriculture and agricultural practices 
to federal or state standards.56 This linkage gives the farmer and the 
land trust the ability to adapt to changing agricultural practices 
without violating the terms of the easement.57 
4. Amendments.  Despite the flexibility written into easements, 
the conservation land trusts that draft farmland conservation 
easements cannot contemplate every change in agricultural 
technology, land use, or land preservation.58 Thus conservation 
easements frequently include a clause that allows the land trust to 
amend the easement upon the request of the landowner.59 The right to 
amend the easement gives both the easement holder and the 
landowner some flexibility to adjust to changed or changing 
conditions.60 
 
supra note 10, § 3, cl. 8 (“The right to construct . . . and use one (1) farm labor housing unit 
(‘FLH’), together with appurtenant non-residential structures and improvements, including 
drives and utilities, normally associated with a residence; provided, however, that the FLH shall 
be (a) occupied by Grantor or at least one person who is a member of Grantor’s family or who 
is employed on the farm, and (b) located in the area depicted as ‘FLH Site’ on the . . . Farm 
Plan.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 55. Anderson & Cosgrove, supra note 9, at 11–12. 
 56. Id. at 10–11. 
 57. See id. (“These standards are flexible; often defined within state or federal 
programs . . . that are updated periodically to reflect changes in agricultural practices. By 
utilizing state-defined or federal standards, the easement grantee may avoid difficult discussions 
with farmers as to ‘who best knows’ how to farm.”). 
 58. See LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, supra note 13, at 9 (“The occasional need to amend an 
easement is rooted in our inability to predict all the circumstances that may arise in the 
future.”); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, 29 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 470 (2005) (“[T]he need to make modifications and adjustments to 
account for changed conditions and societal needs may become acute.”). 
 59. McLaughlin, supra note 58, at 444. 
 60. There is some debate in the land trust community as to whether conservation 
easements should be amendable and, if so, how they should be amended. This Note assumes 
that for some land trusts, amendments are inescapable, and these debates are not relevant for 
the purposes of this Note. See generally id. (advocating the application of the charitable-trust 
doctrine in conservation easements); Andrew C. Dana, Conservation Easement Amendments: 
A View from the Field (2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
learningcenter.lta.org/attached-files/0/57/5754/CE_Amendments-View_from_Field_(ADana_5-
5-06) .pdf (outlining “[l]egal problems with broad application of charitable trust rules” to 
conservation easements). 
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Because amendments change an easement that is meant to 
protect land in perpetuity, land trusts must be careful to ensure that a 
proposed amendment does not undermine the conservation purposes 
of the easement.61 To ensure that conservation land trusts carefully 
analyze any amendment proposal that they receive, the Land Trust 
Alliance (LTA), an umbrella organization and land trust accreditor 
and resource center, gives guidance on how to structure amendments 
and amendment procedures.62 The LTA developed seven principles to 
guide land trusts through an amendment-approval process. To 
approve an amendment using these principles, a land trust must show 
that the amendment: 
1. Clearly serve[s] the public interest and [is] consistent with the 
land trust’s mission. 
2. Compl[ies] with all applicable federal, state and local laws. 
3. [Does not] jeopardize the land trust’s tax-exempt status or status 
as a charitable organization under federal or state law. 
4. [Does not] result in private inurement or confer impermissible 
private benefit. 
5. [Is] consistent with the conservation purpose(s) and intent of the 
easement. 
6. [Is] consistent with the documented intent of the donor, grantor 
and any direct funding source. 
 
 61. See Dana, supra note 60, at 3 (“[T]he tension between (a) land trusts’ conservation 
easement stewardship responsibilities to protect and preserve, in perpetuity, a complement of 
conservation values for the benefit of the public, and (b) changing social demands and values, 
poses perhaps the most difficult challenge that the private land conservation community has 
faced to date.”). 
 62. See Nancy A. McLaughlin & W. William Weeks, In Defense of Conservation 
Easements: A Response to The End of Perpetuity, 9 WYO. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (“The Land Trust 
Alliance is a nonprofit umbrella organization that provides training and education to, and 
develops policies and standards for, the over 1,700 local, state, and regional land trusts operating 
in the United States.”). Many of the LTA’s reports and policies are developed by legal scholars 
and its materials are widely cited, including by Professor Nancy McLaughlin and Timothy 
Lindstrom. See, e.g., LINDSTROM, supra note 16, at 38; Lindstrom, supra note 14, at 26; 
Lindstrom, supra note 21, at 4; Nancy A. McLaughlin, Amending Perpetual Conservation 
Easements: A Case Study of the Myrtle Grove Controversy, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1031, 1060 
(2006); McLaughlin & Weeks, supra, at 9; McLaughlin, supra note 58, at 423. Additionally, the 
LTA has been cited in one case on conservation easements. See Whitehouse Hotel L.P. v. 
Comm’r, 615 F.3d 321, 329 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing LAND TRUST ALLIANCE & NATIONAL TRUST 
FOR HISTORICAL PRESERVATION, APPRAISING EASEMENTS (3d. ed. 1999), to illustrate the 
complicated nature of easement appraisals). 
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7. Ha[s] a net beneficial or neutral effect on the relevant 
conservation values protected by the easement.63 
These principles are designed to ensure that the land trust and its 
amended easement remain true to its charitable purpose and do not 
violate any relevant laws. 
C. Land Trusts and Amendments 
To maintain its charitable status, a land trust must always work 
to further its mission. It is particularly important for land trusts to 
keep their mission in the forefront during the amendment-approval 
process. The seven principles listed in the previous subsection are all 
different ways of asking the same question: Is the amendment 
consistent with the charitable purposes of the easement? Or, in other 
words, does the amendment protect or improve the conservation 
value furthered by the easement? 
Amendment proposals can be grouped into three different types 
based on this question.64 The first group includes amendments that 
have positive conservation impacts. For example, a land trust might 
approve an amendment that protects more land under the easement 
than what was originally protected. By protecting more land, these 
amendments further the land trust’s charitable mission. Conversely, 
land trusts should not approve the second group of amendments—
those that remove restrictions on development. Amendments with 
negative conservation impacts work directly against the land trust’s 
charitable mission of preserving land. In both instances, it is relatively 
clear whether a land trust would advance or undermine its charitable 
purpose by approving an amendment. 
This analysis becomes more complicated with a third group of 
amendments that have—in the words of the LTA’s standard—
“neutral effect[s].”65 Neutral-impact amendments typically allow a 
farmer to add facilities or technologies that improve the viability or 
 
 63. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, supra note 13, at 17. 
 64. These groupings are based on work by Professor McLaughlin and the LTA. See id. at 
78 (using a matrix to highlight the positive and negative conservation impacts of proposed 
easements); McLaughlin, supra note 62, at 1076 (“Although courts traditionally have been 
reluctant to find that a trustee has powers not expressly granted in the gift or trust instrument 
(hence the desirability of including an express amendment provision in conservation easement 
deeds), interpreting conservation easements as granting the holders the implied power to make 
clearly neutral or enhancing amendments would be consistent with the goals of the charitable 
trust rules.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
 65. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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productivity of the farm with no impact on the conservation value of 
the easement.66 Take, for example, a proposal for an amendment to 
increase and modernize a farmstead complex by ten acres in return 
for conserving ten additional acres with an equivalent conservation 
value.67 The amendment has a neutral conservation impact because it 
neither decreases nor increases the conservation value of the land. In 
essence, a neutral-impact amendment allows the land trust to strike a 
difficult balance—it protects the underlying conservation value of the 
land and supports the additional goal of keeping farmland in 
production. In this light, a neutral-impact amendment seems like a 
win-win. Yet, surprisingly, if a land trust were to approve a neutral-
impact amendment, it would run the risk of violating the private 
benefit doctrine and losing its charitable status. 
II.  THE PRIVATE BENEFIT DOCTRINE 
Under the private benefit doctrine, if the IRS finds that a tax-
exempt organization conferred a substantial private benefit on 
another party, the organization’s tax-exempt status will be revoked.68 
A private benefit is any benefit conferred on a disinterested 
individual or organization69 that serves a private rather than a 
charitable or public interest.70 On its face, this principle is clear, but 
the application of the doctrine is quite difficult.71 One scholar has 
described the doctrine as simply a “mess.”72 The messiness of the 
doctrine stems from two main issues. First, the private benefit 
doctrine is not directly codified in a statute but instead originates in 
IRS regulations. Second, the doctrine has an unclear purpose and 
 
 66. See infra Part III. 
 67. See infra Part III.B. 
 68. See Megosh et al., supra note 3, at 139 (“[I]f private interests are served other than 
incidentally, exemption is precluded.”). 
 69. In the private benefit context, disinterested individuals and organizations include 
anyone who receives benefits from the tax-exempt organization other than the intended 
recipients of the charitable activity. Id. at 139. 
 70. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1068–69 (1989). 
 71. See John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1065 (2006) 
(“This is a quintessential balancing test under which the IRS both owns and reads the 
scale . . . . [N]o one even knows what to balance, since practically any transaction undertaken by 
an exempt charity will result in benefit to some private party outside the charitable class.”); 
Megosh et al., supra note 3, at 143 (“In reality it is difficult to apply the private benefit 
analysis.”). 
 72. Colombo, supra note 71, at 1093. 
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lacks an articulable general theory.73 To make matters worse, the IRS 
has been inconsistent in its application of the doctrine—applying it in 
some cases and not in others.74 Additionally, no case law exists that 
would help clarify the doctrine; the case that would have provided the 
most promising chance at fully delineating the doctrine was settled.75 
Recognizing that the private benefit doctrine is unclear, this Part 
briefly outlines the generally agreed-upon tenets of the private 
benefit doctrine and discusses three existing theories on how to apply 
it. These theories are then used in Part III to analyze a land trust’s 
risk of violating the private benefit doctrine if it approves a neutral-
impact amendment. 
A. The Private Benefit Doctrine: Basic Tenets 
Although the motivations and contours of the private benefit 
doctrine remain vague, two aspects of the doctrine are clear. First, the 
overarching goal of the doctrine is to ensure that tax-exempt 
organizations operate for a charitable purpose; and second, tax-
exempt organizations cannot, directly or indirectly, confer a 
substantial private benefit on noncharitable individuals or 
organizations.76 
 
 73. See id. at 1067–80 (detailing the history, origins, and inconsistent application of the 
private benefit doctrine); see also Colombo, supra note 7, at 47 (“Even the Treasury 
Regulations apply the term to at least two distinct analytical paradigms, one involving the size of 
the charitable class and two involving economic arrangements with third parties. A review of 
private rulings and cases indicates that neither the courts nor the IRS really know what the 
phrase ‘private benefit’ means.”). 
 74. Compare Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974, 976 (ruling on the tax-exempt status of 
ancillary partnerships between for-profit and tax-exempt entities without undertaking an 
analysis of the private benefit doctrine), and Colombo, supra note 7, at 12–13 (finding that the 
“private benefit analysis disappeared” in Revenue Ruling 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974, “one of the 
most anticipated exemption rulings of the new millennium,” even though it had been used in a 
similar ruling on joint ventures), with Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718, 719 (discussing the 
private benefit doctrine in the context of joint ventures between for-profit and tax-exempt 
entities). 
 75. See United Cancer Council v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1180 (7th Cir. 1999) (remanding 
the case to consider whether application of the private benefit doctrine was appropriate). 
 76. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Overview of Inurement/Private Benefit Issues 
in IRC 501(c)(3), in IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1990, at 3 (1990), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicc90.pdf (explaining that there is no single means to assess 
whether a tax-exempt organization has conferred an impermissible benefit to a private entity); 
Megosh et al., supra note 3, at 137 (“This article discusses the concept of ‘private benefit’ under 
IRC 501(c)(3) and then describes how it applies to specific fact patterns that raise private 
benefit issues in two areas: housing and charter schools.”). 
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1. Operating for a Charitable Purpose.  The private benefit 
doctrine is designed to ensure that a tax-exempt organization actually 
operates as a charitable organization. To gain or maintain its tax-
exempt status, an organization must be “organized and operated 
exclusively” for one of the charitable purposes listed in § 501(c)(3), 
which includes religious, charitable, scientific, or educational 
purposes.77 
As § 501(c)(3) entities, tax-exempt organizations are exempt 
from federal income tax and often receive exemptions from state 
property taxes, and their donors can take charitable deductions.78 
These various tax benefits constitute a government subsidy for tax-
exempt organizations.79 The benefits also create an incentive for 
abuse. For instance, a tax-exempt organization could be used as a tax 
shelter80 or as a moneymaking strategy,81 or it could be used to avoid 
taxation of an otherwise commercial business.82 In any of these 
instances, the federal government wants to ensure that the implicit 
subsidy of these organizations goes only toward charitable purposes 
and the public good.83 The private benefit doctrine is a key check on 
tax-exempt organizations because it is one way the IRS ensures that a 
nonprofit is in fact charitable84 and not a “for-profit[] in disguise.”85 
2. Derivation and General Rules.  Although the private benefit 
doctrine is not written into § 501(c)(3) of the I.R.C., the IRS derives it 
from Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii), which interprets 
 
 77. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 78. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 52, 75 (3d ed. 2010). 
 79. Id. at 75–76. 
 80. Id. at 7. 
 81. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, a Pennsylvania charity that 
promised to double the money of donors and charities who entrusted New Era with millions of 
dollars, was a classic Ponzi scheme.”). 
 82. See, e.g., id. at 8 (“The Atlantic Monthly chronicled the increasing commercialism of 
American higher education, such as lucrative research alliances and licensing deals with for-
profit companies, sales of naming rights for professorships, buildings and athletic facilities, and 
forays into distance learning and other ‘dot com’ businesses.”). 
 83. See, e.g., id. at 9–10 (discussing increased scrutiny of tax-exempt organizations by 
Congress and the IRS to ensure that tax-exempt status is not abused). 
 84. See id. at 221 (“[The private benefit doctrine] is just another way of saying that an 
organization must be operated exclusively for exempt purposes . . . .”). 
 85. Burton A. Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Mission and Its Financing: Growing Links Between 
Nonprofits and the Rest of the Economy, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 1, 11 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1998). 
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§ 501(c)(3) to provide that “[a]n organization is not organized or 
operated exclusively for [exempt purposes] unless it serves a public 
rather than a private interest.”86 In American Campaign Academy v. 
Commissioner,87 the Tax Court further defined a private benefit as the 
conveyance by a tax-exempt organization of “nonincidental benefits 
conferred on disinterested persons.”88 Secondary private benefits, 
benefits that are conferred on individuals or entities whom the 
organization does not directly serve, are also sufficient for the IRS to 
find a tax-exempt organization to be in violation of the private benefit 
doctrine.89 
Because tax-exempt organizations will unavoidably create some 
private benefit to others through their charitable operations, creating 
an incidental private benefit is permissible.90 For example, a soup 
kitchen that buys food for the homeless families that it serves conveys 
a private benefit to a supermarket. Likewise, volunteers at tax-
exempt organizations receive noneconomic private benefits such as 
the satisfaction of serving their community. In each of these instances, 
however, the organization primarily serves a public interest, and the 
private benefit is incidental. 
Conferring a substantial private benefit, on the other hand, is 
impermissible.91 According to the IRS, whether a benefit is substantial 
is measured on a transaction-by-transaction basis. If an individual 
receives a benefit from the tax-exempt organization that is greater 
than the charitable or public benefit created by that transaction, the 
organization can lose its tax-exempt status.92 The IRS uses both a 
qualitative and a quantitative analysis to determine whether or not a 
 
 86. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2008). 
 87. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989). 
 88. Id. at 1069. 
 89. See, e.g., id. at 1073–75 (denying tax-exempt status to an educational organization 
because it created a substantial “secondary” private benefit to the Republican Party, as most of 
its graduates worked for the party upon graduation). 
 90. See Darryll K. Jones, Private Benefit and the Unanswered Questions from Redlands 
Surgical Services, 29 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 433, 443 (2000) (“[I]n many instances, an entity 
must benefit somebody in particular to achieve its charitable purpose.”). 
 91. Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945) 
(finding that the creation of a private benefit, “if substantial in nature, will destroy the 
exemption regardless of the number or importance” of an organization’s other charitable 
purposes or activities). 
 92. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, at 9 (Nov. 21, 1991) (“It bears emphasis that, even 
though exemption of the entire organization may be at stake, the private benefit conferred by 
an activity or arrangement is balanced only against the public benefit conferred by that activity 
or arrangement, not the overall good accomplished by the organization.”). 
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private benefit is incidental or substantial.93 Under the qualitative 
analysis, a private benefit is incidental when it is an unavoidable 
result or a “mere byproduct of the public benefit.”94 For example, the 
IRS found that an increase in property values and personal 
enjoyment generated by an organization formed to preserve and 
beautify a lake for recreation constituted an insubstantial private 
benefit because the increase was an unavoidable result of the lake 
beautification.95 Thus, the private benefit was merely incidental to the 
public benefit of the lake beautification. 
The quantitative private benefit analysis weighs the private 
benefit against the public benefit. Under this analysis, the private 
benefit must be quantitatively less than the public benefit created by 
the activity.96 The IRS uses two different factors to measure the 
quantitative private benefit: the number of individuals or 
organizations benefited and the net financial benefit received by 
those organizations.97 If a small number of individuals or 
organizations receive a benefit, the IRS is likely to find that a private 
benefit is substantial.98 If the financial benefit to an individual or 
organization is greater than the financial benefit to the public, the 
IRS will also likely find that the private benefit is substantial.99 
B. Defining and Applying the Private Benefit Doctrine: Three 
Theories and Tests 
Although some general rules and principles behind the private 
benefit doctrine do exist, the practical application of the doctrine is 
difficult because no unifying or coherent test exists.100 Instead, three 
different tests attempt to interpret and apply the private benefit 
doctrine. Under one test, the doctrine is violated when a tax-exempt 
organization’s activities demonstrate a lack of a charitable class.101 
Under another test, the doctrine simply applies as one part of the 
IRS’s operational test.102 Under the third test, the doctrine is violated 
 
 93. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789, at 3 (Dec. 18, 1978). 
 94. Megosh et al., supra note 3, at 139. 
 95. Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 129. 
 96. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, at 9. 
 97. Megosh et al., supra note 3, at 139–40. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See supra note 71. 
 101. Colombo, supra note 7, at 20. 
 102. See infra notes 110–111 and accompanying text. 
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when a tax-exempt organization’s activities demonstrate a failure to 
conserve charitable assets.103 Each test is based on its own distinct 
theory about the purpose of the private benefit doctrine. 
1. The Private Benefit Doctrine as an Assessment of the Lack of a 
Charitable Class.  Under this theory, the private benefit doctrine 
restates the common-law rule that “a charity must serve a broad 
charitable class.”104 The test focuses on the size of the charitable class 
to determine whether or not a transaction conveys a private benefit. 
If the charitable class for a given benefit is too small or does not exist, 
the IRS will find that the tax-exempt organization conferred a 
substantial private benefit.105 The example commonly cited to support 
this theory is a revenue ruling in which the IRS denied tax-exempt 
status to an organization created to improve one city block,106 even 
though the IRS had previously granted tax-exempt status to an 
organization created to beautify an entire city.107 Under this theory, 
the organization created to improve one city block was denied tax-
exempt status because the organization had too few beneficiaries.108 
 
 103. Colombo, supra note 71, at 1088–89. Professor Colombo briefly notes a fourth theory, 
the “failure of duty of care.” See Colombo, supra note 7, at 22–25 (discussing private benefit as 
the federal incorporation of a duty of care); see also United Cancer Council v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 
1173, 1180 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he board of a charity has a duty of care, just like the board of an 
ordinary business corporation, and a violation of that duty which involved the dissipation of the 
charity’s assets might . . . support a finding that the charity was conferring a private benefit, even 
if the contracting party did not control, or exercise undue influence over, the charity.” (citations 
omitted)). This theory, however, is only briefly mentioned in one case and does not seem to 
have been used or further explained in any IRS writings. This Note thus does not discuss it 
further. 
 104. Colombo, supra note 7, at 4. 
 105. See, e.g., id. (“[F]or example, a trust to maintain a public graveyard was considered 
charitable, but not one to maintain a[n] individual’s private tomb.”). 
 106. Rev. Rul. 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210, 210; see also Colombo, supra note 7, at 4 (using the 
ruling as an example of the theory that a “charity must serve a broad charitable class”). 
 107. Rev. Rul. 68-14, 1968-1 C.B. 243. 
 108. Rev. Rul. 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. at 210. One problem with using this example to support 
this theory is that the IRS, in Revenue Ruling 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210, examined not only the 
size of a tax-exempt organization’s charitable class, but also the amount of financial private 
benefit given to the landowners, id. In the revenue ruling, the IRS specifically noted that the 
beautification of one city block would give a substantial private benefit to adjacent landowners 
who would see an increase in their property values. Id. The IRS examined not merely the size of 
the charitable class, but also how the size of the financial private benefit compared to the overall 
public benefit. It is unclear whether the IRS would have come to the same result had it solely 
discussed the size of the nonprofit’s charitable class. 
  One way to address this ambiguity would be to expand the charitable-class theory by 
combining it with the IRS’s existing quantitative analysis. See supra notes 97–99 and 
accompanying text. Under this expanded theory, “substantial” private benefit can be measured 
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2. The Private Benefit Doctrine as a Part of the Operational Test.  
Under this theory, the private benefit doctrine is part of the 
operational test that the IRS uses to determine whether or not an 
organization is operated for a charitable purpose.109 The operational 
test is composed of three different parts: the substantial-nonexempt-
purpose test, the private inurement test, and the private benefit 
doctrine.110 These parts overlap to some degree, but each serves its 
own distinct purpose, allowing the IRS to revoke or deny an 
organization’s charitable status based on the presence of many 
different factors.111 
As part of the operational test, the private benefit doctrine 
weighs the charitable purpose of the organization against the benefit 
received by private, noncharitable interests.112 For example, a hospital 
that provides services to a large charitable class and that fulfills its 
charitable purpose may be found to have conveyed a substantial 
private benefit if the hospital’s structure creates a private benefit for 
the controlling physicians such that they have a “closed, preferential 
system in which to practice medicine.”113 In this instance a charitable 
purpose exists, but the private benefit given to the physicians is too 
 
both by the size of the charitable class and by comparing the amount of financially quantifiable 
private benefit to the financial benefit to the public. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying 
text. Under the expanded version of the theory, the block’s beautification organization in 
Revenue Ruling 75-286 created a substantial private benefit because it benefitted a small 
charitable class and increased the landowners’ property values, outweighing the increase in the 
value to the public. The organization dedicated to beautifying an entire city, however, did not 
create a substantial private benefit because its charitable class was the entire public, and the 
private benefits did not outweigh the public benefits because they were unquantifiable and an 
unavoidable result of the public benefit. 
 109. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra 
note 76, at 12 (“[T]he operational test standard prohibiting a substantial non-exempt purpose is 
broad enough to include inurement, private benefit, and operations which further nonprofit 
goals outside the scope of IRC 501(c)(3).”). 
 110. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-10020, at 22 (Mar. 11, 2011) (“The operational test is not 
satisfied where any part of the organization’s earnings inure to the benefit of private 
shareholders or individuals, and where the organization serves a private benefit rather than 
public interests.”). 
 111. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. 2004-31023, at 20 (July 30, 2004) (“The private benefit 
theory and the substantial nonexempt purpose theory overlap substantially. They both are 
rooted in the operational test. The differences are not so much ones of legal principle as they 
are ones of the types of facts that tend to lead to the conclusion that the operational test has not 
been met.”). 
 112. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, at 9 (Nov. 21, 1991) (“Determining whether a benefit 
flowing to private individuals evidences a substantial noncharitable purpose frequently requires 
balancing [the private benefit against the public benefit].”). 
 113. Colombo, supra note 71, at 1082. 
GENTRY IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2013  3:51 PM 
1408 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1387 
great in comparison. The nonprofit hospital with such a structure 
would not operate charitably but rather for the benefit of the 
physicians. 
One criticism of this theory is that it makes the private benefit 
doctrine no different than the substantial-nonexempt-purpose test 
because the existence of a substantial private benefit can result in the 
revocation or denial of an organization’s charitable status, even if the 
organization’s overall charitable purposes outweigh the private 
benefit created by the transaction.114 Thus, if the private benefit 
doctrine is to be useful as a stand-alone doctrine, it must be more 
than shorthand for the substantial-nonexempt-purpose test.115 
But the private benefit doctrine is not just a substitute for 
another test. Instead, it is an expansion of the methods with which the 
IRS can either revoke or deny an organization’s tax-exempt status. 
Each part of the operational test addresses a different area of abuse. 
The first part, the substantial-nonexempt-purpose test, specifically 
looks at the purpose of the charity: does it qualify under 
§ 501(c)(3)?116 If there are multiple purposes, are a substantial number 
of those purposes tax-exempt?117 If not, the organization’s tax-exempt 
status will be revoked or denied. The second part of the operational 
test—examining private inurement and excess-benefit transactions—
is designed to ensure that insiders of a tax-exempt organization do 
not “unjustly enrich” themselves at a cost to the organization.118 The 
private inurement doctrine prohibits the inurement of net earnings to 
insiders.119 If the IRS finds private inurement, it will sanction the 
nonprofit by revoking or denying its tax-exempt status.120 The 
prohibition of excess-benefit transactions supplements the private 
inurement test by expanding the definition of insiders to include 
“disqualified individuals”121 and by allowing the IRS to use excise 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-10020, at 24–26 (Mar. 11, 2011). 
 117. Id. 
 118. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 76, at 1–3. 
 119. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 120. See Michael Folz Wexler & Alvin J. Geske, The Private Benefit Rule and Interaction of 
Excess Benefit Transaction Taxes with Revocation, 104 J. TAX’N 304, 304 (2006) (“These excise 
tax sanctions were thought to be a more effective way to enforce the no-inurement requirement 
than revocation of exemption in most instances where the transgression was relatively minor in 
comparison with the charitable activities of the organization.”). 
 121. The excess-benefit-transaction regulations prohibit the provision of an excess economic 
benefit to “disqualified person[s],” which include anyone who can “exercise substantial 
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taxes as intermediate sanctions if the IRS finds an excess-benefit 
transaction to have occurred.122 
The substantial purpose and private inurement tests alone, 
however, only address abuses of an organization’s tax-exempt status 
by insiders or disqualified individuals. There are still opportunities for 
abuse in ways that benefit those unrelated to a nonprofit. The private 
benefit doctrine gives the IRS the ability to catch those abuses that do 
not violate either the substantial-nonexempt-purpose or the private 
inurement tests. Thus the operational test in its entirety helps the IRS 
address multiple types of abusive organizations.123 Each part of the 
test addresses a different type of abuse—noncharitable purposes, 
insider transactions, and financial and nonfinancial benefits to 
disinterested individuals or organizations—that outweighs the 
benefits conferred on the public or the relevant charitable class. 
3. The Private Benefit Doctrine as an Assessment of a Failure To 
Conserve Charitable Assets.  The third theory, developed by Professor 
John Colombo, views the private benefit doctrine as a tool for 
policing joint ventures between tax-exempt and for-profit 
organizations by splitting an organization’s activities into routine and 
core services.124 Under this theory, the private benefit doctrine does 
not apply to a tax-exempt organization’s routine services125 but may 
apply to its core services depending on the circumstances of the 
transaction.126 This theory begins with a presumption that creating a 
private benefit is incidental for routine services.127 Routine services 
are those services that are unrelated to the charitable mission of the 
 
influence over the affairs of the organization” as well as their family members, and any 
corporation in which the individual or his or her family has more than a 35 percent stake. I.R.C. 
§ 4958(f)(1) (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 122. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(a) (as amended in 2002). For the first violation, the tax is 
equivalent to 25 percent of the excess benefit against the individual who received the benefit, 
and the person who authorized the transaction is taxed 10 percent on the benefit. Id. § 53.4958-
1(c)(1). If the organization does not fix the private inurement issue, the tax for the recipient 
increases to 200 percent of the total benefit received. Id. § 53.4958-1(c)(2). 
 123. On first glance, it can be difficult to rationalize why a tax-exempt organization would 
confer benefits to an outsider who is not part of the charitable class. Yet, there are instances in 
which such organizations give inappropriate benefits to noninsiders. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 2011-10020, at 26–27 (Mar. 11, 2011) (finding that a land trust gave excessive financial 
benefits to landowners and donors who were not insiders). 
 124. Colombo, supra note 71, at 1087. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Id. at 1087–88. 
 127. Colombo, supra note 7, at 28. 
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organization but that are necessary for the organization to function.128 
For example, hiring for-profit janitorial services or contracting with 
utilities to provide heat and electricity are routine services that create 
an unavoidable private benefit.129 The theory presumes that the type 
of private benefit created by routine services is incidental because the 
benefit conferred allows the nonprofit to focus the majority of its 
funds on its mission.130 For example, a soup kitchen would not invest 
in building its own power source when it could pay a utility company 
for electricity and spend more of its resources on feeding the 
hungry.131 Because arms-length contracts for routine services are 
economically efficient and are unlikely to create large opportunities 
for abuse, the theory presumes that these contracts create only 
incidental private benefit.132 
This presumption of incidental private benefit, however, does 
not apply when the transaction relates to the core services of the tax-
exempt organization.133 Core services are “services that form the core 
primary charitable purpose” of the organization.134 Under this theory, 
the private benefit doctrine should apply when a tax-exempt 
organization “outsources the delivery of its core services” or when it 
enters into an economic transaction that gives a for-profit firm a 
competitive advantage.135 In each instance the tax-exempt 
organization runs the risk of failing to conserve charitable assets 
because they are used in for-profit transactions when those assets 
could instead be used to benefit a charitable class.136 A tax-exempt 
organization can avoid a finding of failing to conserve charitable 
assets if it shows a reasonable justification for why the transaction is 
in the best interests of the charitable class, namely that the 
arrangement is a “more efficient or ‘better’ way to deliver services to 




 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 28, 30. 
 131. Id. at 28. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 30. 
 134. Colombo, supra note 71, at 1087. 
 135. Id. at 1089. 
 136. Colombo, supra note 7, at 30. 
 137. Colombo, supra note 71, at 1089. 
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In short, the private benefit doctrine is indeed a mess.138 When 
amending farmland conservation easements, land trusts are left 
wondering how the private benefit doctrine might be applied. A land 
trust has no way to know if it will be judged based on the size of the 
charitable class, how it will be viewed under the operational test, or if 
it might be viewed as a joint venture that is outsourcing its core 
services or giving for-profit organizations a competitive advantage. 
III.  THE PRIVATE BENEFIT DOCTRINE AND NEUTRAL-IMPACT 
AMENDMENTS 
Neutral-impact amendments—amendments that help balance a 
working-land easement’s goal of keeping farmland in production 
without sacrificing conservation value—likely violate the private 
benefit doctrine under all three theories that were discussed in the 
previous Part. This is an unfortunate outcome. By approving a 
neutral-impact amendment, a land trust does not reduce the 
conservation value of the land. Neither does a land trust, in approving 
such an amendment, abuse the organization’s tax-exempt status 
because the amendment does not undermine the land trust’s 
charitable purpose and because the land trust’s earnings do not inure 
to the benefit of insiders. Instead the amendment fulfills the other 
goal of the underlying conservation easement by keeping farmland in 
production and addressing the needs of the farmer. A neutral-impact 
amendment allows the farmer to modify farming operations without 
negatively impacting the conservation value of the land—a good way 
for the land trust to meet one of its goals without sacrificing the other. 
The analysis in the two examples below, however, suggests that a 
neutral-impact amendment will likely violate the private benefit 
doctrine. But this outcome seems counterintuitive, particularly 
because the amendment attempts to balance the competing purposes 
inherent in farmland and working-land conservation easements by 
fulfilling the needs of the farmer without injuring the conservation 
value of the land itself. 
A. Example One: Installing Cell Antennas in Silos 
The first example of a neutral-impact amendment that is likely to 
violate the private benefit doctrine is an amendment allowing a local 
 
 138. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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utility to install cellular antennas on conserved farms. In this example, 
a local utility asked several farmers if it could install cellular antennas 
on or inside the farmers’ silos.139 The installed antennas would have 
zero conservation impact. They would be “virtually invisible,” 
keeping open space and scenic views intact, and they would not 
require additional land to be released from existing development 
restrictions.140 Additionally, the antennas would not impede the 
farmers’ use of the silos, and their installation would allow the utility 
to use existing structures rather than build new cellular towers on 
previously undeveloped land.141 In many ways this would seem like a 
straightforward decision—the farmers would gain additional income 
from leasing the silo, other land would remain protected from the 
new development for cellular towers, scenic views would be 
preserved, and the antennas would improve overall cellular coverage 
for the general public.142 
Several of the farmers in this example, however, had conserved 
their land through conservation easements. As written, these 
easements prohibit commercial uses on the farm, except those 
specifically named in the easement.143 For example, an easement limits 
the farm to “agriculture, forestry, home occupations, and ‘accessory 
uses,’ such as making cheese from milk produced on the farm.”144 To 
install the antennas, the farmers and the land trust would need to 
amend the easement.145 Although the benefits of the proposed 
amendment would be many, a review of the three theories of the 
private benefit doctrine seems to indicate that an amendment like this 
would violate the private benefit doctrine. 
1. Examining the Size of the Charitable Class.  Under the theory 
that the IRS must assess the size of a nonprofit’s charitable class, the 
approval of this request to install an antenna seems immediately to 
violate the private benefit doctrine. The amendment would directly 
benefit only one farmer and would indirectly benefit the utility 
company. The general public may recognize some benefit through the 
preservation of the scenic view, but the primary purpose of the 
 
 139. This hypothetical is derived from Bradley, supra note 1, at 27. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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amendment is not to protect the scenic view. Rather, the amendment 
is meant to allow the farmer, who is not a member of the land trust’s 
charitable class, to install an antenna on his farm. 
2. Applying the Private Benefit Doctrine as Part of the 
Operational Test.  The transaction also likely fails under the 
operational test because it creates a substantial private benefit that 
probably outweighs the public benefit created by the amendment. In 
this transaction, a quantifiable primary private benefit would be 
conferred on the landowner because the silo would generate rental 
income. The utility company would receive a quantifiable secondary 
private benefit in the form of decreased antenna-construction costs 
and an extended network. Both of these private benefits are quite 
substantial, particularly when weighed against the fact that the 
amendment did not further the conservation purposes of the 
easement. Yet, the amendment would also create some positive 
public benefit—it would protect other lands from being developed 
and would preserve scenic views from being broken up by larger 
cellular towers. It is unclear, however, if this public benefit would 
outweigh the substantial private benefit conferred on both the farmer 
and the utility. 
Viewing the private benefit doctrine in relation to the other parts 
of the operational test, the land trust is still operating primarily for a 
charitable purpose, and its net earnings do not inure to any insiders. 
Even so, because this single transaction created a substantial private 
benefit, the IRS has the authority to revoke the tax-exempt status of 
the land trust if it were to approve this amendment.146 But should this 
private benefit jeopardize the land trust’s tax-exempt status when the 
amendment would not negatively impact the conservation value of 
the easement and would not otherwise violate the operational test? 
3. Testing a Failure To Conserve Charitable Assets.  It is difficult 
to determine how this amendment fits into the third test, which 
inquires into a tax-exempt organization’s failure to conserve 
charitable assets. The first question under this test is whether 
amending a conservation easement would be considered a core 
service related directly to the entity’s charitable purpose.147 In this 
case, the core service of the land trust is to protect land. One could 
 
 146. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 147. Colombo, supra note 7, at 30. 
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argue that the proposed amendment is directly related to the core 
services of the land trust because it would change the conservation 
easement, which is the main method that a land trust uses to preserve 
land.148 Conversely, perhaps the amendment is not related to the core 
services of the land trust because it would not have any effect on the 
purposes or conservation value of the easement. Under this 
understanding of core services, an amendment would only be related 
to the core services of the land trust if the amendment had a negative 
or a positive conservation impact. 
If an analysis determined that approving neutral-impact 
amendments is a routine service of a land trust, the examination 
under the private benefit doctrine would stop there.149 If approving 
the amendments is determined to be a land trust’s core service, the 
amendment would violate the private benefit doctrine if the 
transaction allowed the land trust to do one of two things: either 
outsource its core services or enter into an economic transaction that 
creates a competitive advantage for a for-profit entity.150 The 
transaction in this hypothetical would not fit into the first category 
because the land trust would not be outsourcing its work. The land 
trust would not be contracting with another for-profit entity to 
provide land preservation services in its place. The transaction may fit 
into the second category, but it is unclear if an economic transaction 
would be present. The land trust merely would be giving the farmer 
permission to enter into a transaction that created an economic 
benefit for both the farmer and the utility. Is giving permission to 
someone else to enter into an economic transaction the same as 
entering into an economic transaction?151 If this amendment were 
considered an economic transaction, it would create a competitive 
advantage for two for-profit parties. It would offer the farmer 
supplemental income and would provide the utility a better 
 
 148. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 149. See Colombo, supra note 7, at 30 (positing that the IRS should not apply the private 
benefit doctrine to “routine transactions for ‘incidental’ services”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. A similar question to the one posed in this discussion is whether a land trust that gives 
permission to a farmer to grant a benefit to another entity should be treated the same as a land 
trust that confers a private benefit on the farmer. Although this Note does not delve into this 
question, it may be worth future scholarly exploration. 
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distribution network, both of which would violate the private benefit 
doctrine.152 
B. Example Two: Land Swap To Increase Farm Viability 
Another common example of a neutral-impact amendment that 
likely violates the private benefit doctrine is a land swap used to 
increase farm viability. In this example, a dairy farm was conserved 
thirty years ago. The original conservation easement conserved 125 
acres of land and set aside fifteen acres for the farmstead complex.153 
Initially the fifteen acres were sufficient for the farmer to operate and 
run a successful farm. As technology and the dairy market changed, 
however, the farmstead complex eventually became too small to 
support the farm structures necessary to sustain the farming 
operation. If the farmer could not expand his operations, the farm 
would likely go out of business. 
The farmer then proposed a land swap, asking the land trust to 
release the conservation easement’s restrictions on ten acres of land 
adjoining the existing farmstead complex in return for conserving an 
additional ten acres of land with comparable conservation value.154 
This land swap would have a neutral conservation impact: while ten 
acres would be opened to development, an additional ten acres would 
be preserved. Again, similar to the antenna example, this seems to be 
a mutually beneficial transaction—the farm would remain viable, it 
could adapt to changing circumstances, and there would be no net 
loss to the conservation value of the land trust’s easement. 
1. Examining the Size of the Charitable Class.  The land trust’s 
approval of the land swap would likely violate the private benefit 
doctrine under the theory that examines the size of the tax-exempt 
organization’s charitable class. The amendment would benefit only 
one farmer who is not a member of the charitable class. Nor would 
the amendment seem to create a benefit for the public because the 
net sum of land preserved, and thus the total conservation value 
protected, would remain the same. 
 
 152. The land trust would be at risk of violating the private benefit doctrine with respect to 
both the farmer and the utility, as the utility would receive a secondary private benefit. See 
supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text. 
 153. For the definition of farmstead complex, see supra text accompanying note 53. 
 154. The author developed this example through conversations with Dennis Shaffer, 
Director of Stewardship, and Rick Peterson, Project Counsel, at the Vermont Land Trust. 
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2. Applying the Private Benefit Doctrine as Part of the 
Operational Test.  The land-swap amendment would also likely 
violate the private benefit doctrine under the operational test. Under 
this test, the amendment would not further the conservation purposes 
of the easement and would confer a seemingly substantial private 
benefit on a disinterested individual: the increase in the size of the 
farmstead complex would allow the farmer to increase the production 
and viability of the farm. This private benefit would outweigh the 
seemingly nonexistent public benefit. If, however, public benefits are 
judged on a broader scale—that is, if protecting working lands and 
balancing land uses create a public benefit—perhaps this transaction 
would not violate the private benefit doctrine.155 Once again, this 
predicament highlights the following question: should the creation of 
a private benefit be enough to revoke a land trust’s tax-exempt status 
when it would not negatively impact the conservation value of the 
easement and would not violate any other part of the operational 
test? 
3. Testing a Failure To Conserve Charitable Assets.  The land-
swap example would also likely violate the theory of the public 
benefit doctrine based on a failure to conserve charitable assets. The 
core-service debate remains the same as in the previous example.156 If 
approving the amendment is determined to be a core service, the land 
trust would not seem to have outsourced its core services, but rather 
would seem to have entered into an economic transaction. The land 
trust would participate in an exchange of land, removing restrictions 
on ten acres of land in return for adding new restrictions on a 
different ten acres. The economic transaction would likely create a 
competitive advantage for the farmer, which violates the private 
benefit doctrine under Professor Colombo’s theory.157 Increasing the 
size of the farmstead complex would allow the farmer to adapt to and 
compete in the changing economy, but this would give the farmer a 





 155. See infra Part IV.D. 
 156. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 157. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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Both examples in this Part illustrate the counterintuitive results 
created by the application of the private benefit doctrine to neutral-
impact amendments. In each example, the land trust approves an 
amendment that furthers one of the easement’s goals: supporting 
agricultural use. Plus, the amendment does not negatively impact the 
conservation value of the land. A land trust should not run the risk of 
violating the private benefit doctrine with such an amendment. As 
such, this Note argues that the IRS should consider the private 
benefit doctrine to be a doctrine that protects against abuse and 
should not apply it to neutral-impact amendments. 
IV.  MOVING THE PRIVATE BENEFIT DOCTRINE FORWARD 
The application of the private benefit doctrine to neutral-impact 
amendments creates undesirable results. It makes little sense to put a 
land trust at risk of losing its tax-exempt status when an amendment 
gives farmers the flexibility under the easement to keep the land in 
production without decreasing the underlying conservation value of 
the land. Through such an amendment, the land trust can further one 
purpose of the easement without sacrificing the other. Thus, the IRS 
should not apply the private benefit doctrine to neutral-impact 
amendments. The messiness of the private benefit doctrine itself 
would justify efforts by the IRS to clarify the doctrine, particularly in 
areas in which its application is unclear or would create undesirable 
results. The existing theories behind the doctrine are targeted to 
address very different circumstances than those created by the 
approval of a neutral-impact amendment. Two of the three theories 
behind the private benefit doctrine—the theory based on the lack of a 
charitable class and the theory that places the private benefit doctrine 
as part of the operational test—seem to be designed to prevent clear 
abuses of the nonprofit status. These theories test for organizations 
that do not violate the substantial-nonexempt-purpose test or the 
private inurement doctrine yet still do not seem entirely charitable or 
else are for-profit organizations in disguise.158 The third theory, the 
 
 158. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-206, 1976-1 C.B. 154 (finding that an organization that sought to 
preserve and maintain classical music programming did have a valid charitable purpose and did 
not violate the private inurement doctrine, but did violate the private benefit doctrine because 
“[i]t was formed in response to an announcement by a local for-profit radio station that the 
station intended to cease broadcasting classical music because of financial difficulty” and 
because “[t]he organization accomplishe[d] its purpose by engaging in a variety of activities 
designed to stimulate public interest in the classical music programs of the for-profit station, and 
thereby enable the station to continue broadcasting such music”). 
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failure to preserve charitable assets, was developed to address the 
private benefit doctrine in relation to joint ventures.159 Land trusts, if 
following all other rules, do not fit under any of these theories when 
approving a neutral-impact amendment—they are neither a for-profit 
in disguise nor a joint venture. 
The IRS has also been inconsistent in its application of the 
private benefit doctrine. Not only do the theories behind the doctrine 
vary, but the IRS has also chosen not to apply the doctrine in 
instances in which common sense would expect it to be applied.160 
With a doctrine as open for interpretation as this one, the IRS has the 
ability to choose not to apply the private benefit doctrine to neutral-
impact amendments, and it should decline to do so. But this decision 
should not be ad hoc. Instead, the IRS should use formal guidance 
such as a revenue ruling to acknowledge that neutral-impact 
amendments do not violate the private benefit doctrine. This would 
create a clear standard for land trusts and reduce confusion.161 
The IRS should not apply the private benefit doctrine to neutral-
impact amendments for several reasons. First, the private benefit 
doctrine should be used only to curb abuses. Second, these 
amendments allow land trusts and the IRS to recognize and balance 
the inherent tension in preserving working lands as open space. Third, 
some neutral-impact amendments merely update an easement to 
reflect current easement-drafting standards. Fourth, the preservation 
of working lands creates a public benefit that outweighs the 
conveyance of a private benefit. And finally, allowing such 
amendments may encourage the use of working-land conservation 
easements in general. 
A. Private Benefit as an Anti-Abuse Doctrine 
The private benefit doctrine should only be used to curb abuses. 
In the case of conservation easements, the private benefit doctrine 
 
 159. See Colombo, supra note 71, at 1092 (discussing the private benefit doctrine in relation 
to joint ventures). 
 160. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 161. Instead of using a revenue ruling, the IRS could create intermediate sanctions for a tax-
exempt organization that violates the private benefit doctrine similar to the sanctions the IRS 
gives for a violation of the excess-benefit-transaction test. See supra notes 121–122 and 
accompanying text. Depending on which factors the IRS decided to use, neutral impact 
amendments might not violate the private benefit doctrine. The implications of creating a 
formal set of factors for discerning violations of the private benefit doctrine would be fertile 
ground for further scholarly investigation. 
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should apply only to amendments that negatively impact the 
conservation value of an easement. For example, a recent revocation 
of a land trust’s tax-exempt status, based in part on the approval of 
several negative conservation impact amendments, illustrates a clear 
violation and the proper application of the private benefit doctrine.162 
In this example, a land trust approved several amendments that 
allowed the landowners to subdivide and build on their property.163 
These amendments dramatically increased the value of the land to the 
landowners and significantly reduced the amount of land protected 
from development.164 
Unlike approving an amendment that negatively impacts an 
easement’s conservation value, approving a neutral-impact 
amendment, unless accompanied by other violations, is not an abuse 
of an organization’s tax-exempt status. A land trust that follows the 
LTA amendment policies, works toward a charitable end, and does 
not inure its net earnings to insiders should not be at risk of losing its 
tax-exempt status simply because it approves a neutral-impact 
amendment. It is one thing when a land trust allows the landowner to 
subdivide and develop conserved land. It is another when the 
amendment helps further one of the easement’s twin goals—to keep 
the land in productive agricultural use—without negatively impacting 
the land’s conservation value. 
 
 162. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-10020, at 27–29 (Mar. 11, 2011). This revenue ruling also 
provides an excellent example of a conservation land trust that clearly abused its nonprofit 
status. In addition to finding substantial private benefit in regard to the amendments, the IRS 
found that: (1) “[m]ore than an insubstantial part of [the land trust’s] activities” were in 
“furtherance of a non-exempt purpose,” id. at 1; (2) private inurement existed; and (3) the land 
trust conferred a private benefit to its donors, id. at 27–29. The IRS based this finding on the 
following facts: First, the land trust did not have any of the policies, procedures, or resources in 
place to ensure that the land was used for conservation purposes alone. Id. at 25. Without the 
commitment to protect the conservation easements, land owners were free to gain a deduction 
on their donation while still using the land however they chose. Second, the net earnings of the 
organization inured to the benefit of the president of the organization, including unreported 
fringe benefits and consultant fees. Id. at 22. Third, the IRS found that there was significant 
private benefit given to each donor. Id. at 27. The donors improperly received a charitable 
contribution deduction because the organization was not a “qualified organization.” Id. In 
addition to failing the entire operational test, the organization failed to follow filing 
requirements and donated to a mayoral race, which violated § 501(c)(3) prohibitions on 
participating in a political campaign. Id. at 28. 
 163. Id. at 27. 
 164. Id. 
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B. Balancing the Tensions Inherent in Preserving Working Lands 
Over the years, the IRS has allowed tax-exempt land trusts to 
preserve farmland and working lands,165 but it has not focused on the 
inherent tensions in allowing such preservation. By not applying the 
private benefit doctrine to neutral-impact amendments, the IRS can 
acknowledge this tension and give land trusts due flexibility to 
balance the needs of land preservation with the needs of a working, 
productive farm—as directed by the conservation easement itself. 
In essence, the IRS, by approving the tax-exempt status of a land 
trust and by permitting a charitable deduction for donations of 
working-land easements to land trusts, has approved the conferral of 
some private benefit: the donor retains current and future rights to 
benefit from the working land. For example, an easement may allow 
the landowner to build an additional building on the preserved land.166 
These sorts of benefits are negotiated into an easement and are 
themselves in service of the overall charitable pursuit of conserving 
land.167 Without providing some current and future benefit to the 
landowner, the landowner has little incentive to donate a 
conservation easement. Thus, some private benefit is already baked 
into a working-land easement; they are just generally seen as 
insubstantial in light of the larger charitable purpose of preserving 
land. 
Further, by allowing farmland easements that explicitly state two 
purposes, the IRS has implicitly sanctioned the benefit that 
preservation of agricultural use creates for farmers. This agricultural 
use, however, is an unavoidable benefit created to preserve the land 
for charitable purposes. A neutral-impact amendment merely allows 
the land trust to better meet the secondary goal of productive 
agricultural use—a private benefit already integrated within the 
easement and certified by the IRS’s approval of the easement. 
If a land trust is able to approve a neutral-impact amendment 
without risk of violating the private benefit doctrine, the land trust 
can help a farm adjust to new situations or technologies that may not 
have been contemplated when the easement was created. Such 
 
 165. See supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 167. See Hutton, supra note 35, at 1.17 (“[T]he activities of the Conservancy are exclusively 
aimed at the production of public benefit, and acquisitions from landowners through donations 
or via purchases not in excess of fair market value can hardly be said to confer any unwarranted 
benefit to participating landowners.”). 
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support for the farmer, however, would not remove or reduce the 
conservation value of the land. Instead, the amendment addresses the 
needs of the farmer without impacting the charitable purpose of 
preservation, thereby meeting both goals of a farmland easement. 
C. Updating the Easement 
A neutral-impact amendment that is used to bring an easement 
up to current best practices should not create a risk of violating the 
private benefit doctrine. Some neutral-impact amendments, such as 
the amendment described in the cellular-antenna example,168 merely 
update the farmer’s easement to include rights developed or 
recognized after the easement is donated or sold to the land trust. For 
instance, many of today’s easements include rural-enterprises or new-
technologies clauses. These clauses allow a farmer to use the land for 
nonagricultural activities if the land used is within the farmstead 
complex and the activity has a neutral conservation impact.169 A 
farmer with a newer conservation easement that included these 
clauses who wanted to add antennas to his farm’s silos would be able 
to do so without an amendment, and the land trust would not risk 
violating the private benefit doctrine.170 Land trusts that hold older 
easements, however, run the risk of conferring a substantial private 
benefit by amending the easement in this situation even though the 
same benefit would be permissible under other easements. Amending 
the conservation easement to bring the easement up to current 
drafting standards—as long as the amendment does not negatively 
impact the conservation value of the land—should not violate the 
private benefit doctrine. 
 
 168. See supra Part III.A. 
 169. See Anderson & Cosgrove, supra note 9, at 11–12 (noting that rural enterprise clauses 
generally take one of two approaches to permitting “diversification of the farm business”—they 
either “[a]llow the rural enterprise as long as it is a subordinate business to the farming 
operation,” or they allow the enterprise “to operate within the farm building envelope”); 
Bradley, supra note 1, at 27 (“[The Vermont Land Trust’s] easements now include a ‘New 
Technologies’ clause, which allows the land trust to approve the use of a technological advance, 
when it does not damage the conservation purpose of the easement.”). 
 170. This provision would not violate the private benefit doctrine because the benefit had 
already been negotiated into the conservation easement and thus was an unavoidable benefit 
created as part of the overall charitable pursuit of conserving land. See supra note 167. 
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D. Public Benefits from Neutral-Impact Amendments 
Although not commonly framed this way, neutral-impact 
amendments that help a farm remain in production provide a 
significant public benefit. Although research in this area is still 
developing, the theory is that a public benefit is created when 
competing land uses are balanced with each other.171 Working lands, 
including farmlands, are part of this balance.172 Under this theory, 
allowing conserved farmland to evolve and remain productive 
without negatively impacting the conservation value of the land 
provides a public benefit because it ensures that a state or locality 
retains a good mix and balance of land uses.173 
As communities evolve and as land resources become 
increasingly scarce, land planning will become even more critical. 
Cities, states, and even the country, will need to determine the correct 
balance of land uses to best meet a variety of needs. Unfortunately, 
farmland is particularly prone to development pressures: the land is 
flat, has good drainage, and is well-suited to development.174 
Preserving farmland is crucial—farms provide food and fiber for the 
nation, agriculture employs 17 percent of the labor force, and well-
managed farms protect the environment and provide other natural 
goods and services.175 Preservation efforts such as conservation 
easements are a key part of providing a public good: sustaining the 
correct balance of farmland and developed land.176 
Neutral-impact amendments can help keep farmland in 
production, thus helping to maintain the fragile balance between new 
development and working lands. An amendment that helps a farmer 
keep the land in production ensures that an appropriate mix of land 
uses will be maintained—a public good itself—while still keeping the 
conservation value of the land intact. Without a neutral-impact 
amendment that benefits the farmer, a farm may no longer be able to 
 
 171. Interview with Bradford S. Gentry, Professor of Practice, Yale Sch. of Forestry & 
Envtl. Studies, in Cheshire, Conn. (Nov. 23, 2011). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Todd W. Daloz, Farm Preservation: A Vermont Land-Use Perspective, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. 
L. 427, 431–32 (2011). 
 175. Farmland Protection, AM. FARMLAND TRUST, http://farmland.org/programs/ 
protection/default.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
 176. Other farmland-protection tools include agricultural zoning, agricultural districts, 
purchase of development rights, and use-value assessments. Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Beyond 
Fairness: What Really Works To Protect Farmland, 21 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 163, 166–69 (2007). 
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remain in production, which would remove the land from productive 
use and thus disrupt the balance of land uses. If, however, the private 
benefit doctrine did not apply to neutral-impact amendments, the 
land trust could maintain the private benefit that the conservation 
easement granted to the farmer, which would allow the farmer to 
keep the land in production and serve the public good of balanced 
land uses.177 
E. Encouraging Greater Use of Conservation Easements 
Conservation easements are often criticized for not being flexible 
enough,178 and many farmers are loath to add more restrictions to 
their land use. Allowing a land trust to approve neutral-impact 
amendments that benefit the productivity of the farm gives the land 
trust additional flexibility within the easement. This added flexibility 
might encourage other farmers and landowners to donate or sell a 
conservation easement on their property when they otherwise might 
not have. A private benefit doctrine that sanctions the flexibility that 
neutral conservation impact amendments offer, therefore, might 
incentivize conservation through working-land easements in a way 
that could drastically outweigh the private benefits that these 
amendments create for any individual farmers. 
CONCLUSION 
The application of the private benefit doctrine to farmland and 
working-land conservation easements illustrates how law can create 
undesirable and unexpected outcomes when applied to a specific 
situation. When examined separately, both the private benefit 
doctrine and neutral-impact amendments are useful and desirable. At 
its core, the private benefit doctrine is designed to prevent abuses of 
tax-exempt status and successfully does so in the case of amendments 
that have a negative impact on an easement’s conservation value. 
Neutral-impact amendments, however, allow a farmer to adjust to 
 
 177. Interesting questions arise as to whether the preservation of farmland itself should be 
considered a charitable purpose under the IRS guidelines. Given the enormity of this question 
and the variety of farms throughout the nation, these questions are best saved for exploration in 
another paper. 
 178. See generally Adena R. Rissman, Evaluating Conservation Effectiveness and Adaptation 
in Dynamic Landscapes, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145 (2011) (positing adaptive easements 
as a more flexible option than easements currently in use); Greene, supra note 12 (advocating 
for dynamic easements that adapt to changing conditions as opposed to more static conservation 
easements). 
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changing technologies and circumstances without harming the 
conservation value of the land. Yet, as the legal rule stands, a land 
trust risks losing its tax-exempt status under the private benefit 
doctrine if it approves a neutral-impact amendment, such as one that 
would allow a farmer to put an antenna inside a silo or increase the 
size of the farming operation. This scenario makes little sense. Why 
prohibit an amendment that advances one of the stated goals of the 
easement and that does not harm the easement’s other stated goal? 
Conservation land trusts should not run the risk of losing their 
charitable status if they approve a neutral-impact amendment. To 
remedy this unfortunate outcome, the IRS should rule that the 
private benefit doctrine does not apply to neutral-impact 
amendments. The IRS has already bestowed its approval on working-
land easements that allow farmers, land trusts, and communities to 
work together to preserve farms and conserve the environment. 
These parties, therefore, should also be given flexibility to continue to 
work the land, as long as this flexibility does not come at the expense 
of the conservation purpose itself. Neutral-impact amendments allow 
a land trust and a farmer to strike this balance. 
